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Sanctions: Economic Tools in Global Governance Sanctions are usually economic. International trade, financial aid, or both are cut off from the target country. This concept relies on the interdependence states have for their national economic prosperity or survival, and that a negative interruption in a state’s economic interactions is enough to bend its will. Sanctions do not necessarily have to be financial, but will usually always involve some form of capital, whether it is goods for commercial trade, military arms, or humanitarian aid. Sanctions can be either multilateral or bilateral, meaning they can originate from a single state, or a number of states. Often multilateral sanctions are organized and authorized by a multinational organization such as the United Nations (UN). The actors within a set of sanctions are divided in this manner: the state or states, which create and/or carry out the sanctions are "senders", and the state or states which are the site of the impact of the sanctions are known as the "target". [1] Sanctions can be used as a technique of war during conflict, or as a coercive measure alternative to military involvement. As Margret Doxey notes in Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, there are differences in the status and purpose of these types of sanctions: In conditions of war, the target is the enemy; the objective is to hasten its defeat, to reduce or eliminate its capacity to wage war, and to undermine morale.... When economic measures are used as sanctions, the objective should be to deter or dissuade states from pursuing policies which do not conform to accepted norms of international conduct. Compliance is considered to be in the general interest, and sanctions are penalties, which relate specifically to acts, which the international body condemns. [2] One of the key components to economic sanctions is that they are said by theorists to be "coercive" in that they seek to "coerce" the target stare into complying with the sender state’s demands, and in the case of multilateral sanctions, one state (usually there is one main instigator) must coerce other states to agree to a set of rules for the sanctions to make an impact. [3] Sanctions are a component of economic foreign policy, one that has become more widely used since the end of the Cold War. Economic sanctions have become an attractive option for policy-makers who desire to take action in a given situation, but are not willing to go so far as to commit military force, an ideal choice for governments who want to take a strong stance on an issue, but also want an alternative that will have a low domestic political cost. [4] Within the system of globalization, economic sanctions are more likely to have a quicker and farther-reaching impact as states rely the global market and not just regional neighbours for exporting, importing, investments, and aid. In this sense, it is often assumed that multilateral sanctions are more efficient than bilateral ones, because the more states that are involved in a financial embargo of a target country, the more difficulty this target state will have in finding alternative partners. Multilateral sanctions are often more difficult to achieve. One state is usually the driving force behind the call, and will often have to make concessions or assurances to other countries in order to obtain cooperation. International sender states are often prone to backsliding, initially cooperating with the terms of the sanctions, but then abandoning the programme. This is especially the case if there is no international organization supporting the course of action. [5] In the use of bilateral sanctions, there is only one sender state, and so there is the automatic guarantee that a programme of action will continue as long as the sender desires. The question of sanctions raises many concerns dealing with the issue of sovereignty. The United Nations (UN) authorizes the use of international sanctions by states or regional agencies through the Security Council, in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. [6] Many states, which are highly protective of their own national sovereignty, are wary of supporting measures of economic sanctions as they feel that it violates the sovereignty of target states, thereby setting a precedent, which could be used against them in the future. Whether sanctions by their very nature are a violation of international state sovereignty is an ongoing debate amongst theorists and policy-makers alike. The goal of sanctions is to negatively impact the target state so that they will be pressured to cease the action, which the sanctions seek to address. This can be done in several ways. First, sender states hope that their actions will cause an interruption of daily national finances in the target state, and that businesses and the government will lose revenue if they cannot find an alternative to the newly closed market. Later on, the interruption will cause such a stress on the target’s national economic system that they will have to bow to the demands of the sender states. What is implicit is that corporate disruption combined with governmental disorder will cause inter-governmental support for policy changes. If this does not happen, the onus is on citizens to pressure their government to make changes. Herein lies one of the fundamental problems with economic sanctions: very rarely do the populations of a target country possess the political clout to dramatically alter radical national policies. Many countries, which find themselves targets of international economic sanctions, have achieved this through impinging severely on the human rights of those within its borders; hence, relying on public pressure to be an impetus for change is usually ineffectual. This is where a large criticism of economic sanctions stems from: populations in target states are often the ones to suffer the most strain from sanctions and yet are least capable of initiating change. Boutros Boutros-Gahli, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, noted in his 1995, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, that sanctions "'are a blunt instrument' that inflict suffering on vulnerable groups, complicate the work of humanitarian agencies, cause long-term damage to the productive capacity of target nations, and generate severe effects on neighbouring countries." [7] Sanctions can contribute to the further silencing of human rights in this manner. As a result of the humanitarian fallout that often occurs with a system of economic sanctions, international bodies and individual states have begun to look for reassurances that their imposition of sanctions will not have that undesired effect. What is necessary for states to decide is if the negative humanitarian consequences outweigh whatever political objectives may have been accomplished in imposing sanctions. [8] Sanctions are only useful as a tool of foreign economic policy and international coercion if they are successful in compelling target states to conform to the sender states’ requirements, either partially or in whole. It is both impossible and impractical to make a sweeping generalization about whether sanctions are effective or not; what is more appropriate is to examine cases in which economic sanctions have been applied and analyse how they either succeeded or failed in that particular instance. One important, recent case is that of Iraq. On August 2nd, 1990, Iraqi forces illegally invaded and occupied the neighbouring state of Kuwait. When diplomatic efforts failed to result in an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the Gulf War began on January 19th, 1991. When Iraq first invaded Kuwait, the United Nations’ Security Council passed resolution 660 condemning the action and demanding that Iraq immediately withdraw their troops. Four days later, the Security Council passed resolution 661 calling for military, financial, and comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq. These sanctions were made mandatory for all UN members. Exempt from sanctions were supplies "intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs". [9] On February 28th 1991, the military hostilities against Iraq ceased. Shortly after this time, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General Martti Ahtisaari reported that the social infrastructure in the state of Iraq had been mostly destroyed and "the people of Iraq may soon face a further imminent catastrophe, which could include epidemic and famine". [10] Without delving into what is a long and complex chronology of international events, resolutions, and policies from the end of the Gulf War to the present, it is most important to understand that the controversy stems from the knowledge that the economic sanctions against Iraq (most strongly through the oil embargo) have been undeniably devastating to much of their civilian population. The government of Iraq had refused to comply with the demands behind the sanctions on numerous grounds including the argument that compliance would be a violation of their national sovereignty. What further aggravates the issue is that the Iraqi government, in October of 1991, imposed their internal embargo against the Kurdish (the Kurds being one of the most suffering populations within Iraq) occupied area of the north. United Nations convoys carrying supplies to these areas were not to pass government controlled areas to the Kurdish-administered areas. [11] Since the original application of sanctions against Iraq in 1991, they have undergone numerous reformations and revisions, mostly in response to international pressure from various political groups who believe that the sanctions are only devastating the civilian population, and are not meeting the goal of Iraqi compliance with the post-war settlement. The United States, the driving force behind the maintenance of sanctions against Iraq, has been accused to destroying an innocent civilian population out of national spite for the Iraqi government and its President, Saddam Hussein. It has been speculated by many theorists, and indeed vocalized by several American government officials, that the United States will not consider the removal of sanctions until there is a change of government in Iraq. [12] This goal casts a note of malice upon the sanctions, and further alienates humanitarian concerns. It is the opinion of many that the application of sanctions against Iraq by the international community has been a failure. They have failed to compel the Iraqi government to meet the UN’s demands, and instead caused a "virtual destruction of a society". [13] For roughly the past ten years, the majority of Iraqi civilians have "subsisted in a state of extreme depravation, with health care, nutrition, education, water, sanitation, and other basic services at minimal levels". [14] The international community was mistaken in thinking that the Saddam Hussein government would give into the demands of the United Nations. In a profound letter to the Guardian newspaper in London, Sabah Jawad and Kamil Mahdi wrote that the "emaciated Iraqi children are neither legitimate pawns in a just struggle or a future threat to be extinguished". [15] The case of Iraq has raised many questions in international communities about the ethical and legal use of sanctions under the Geneva Convention of 1977. The other side of this argument is usually illustrated in the example of South Africa. South Africa was governed under a system of apartheid, of racial segregation and discrimination. Black civilians within the state were subjected to brutal treatment, and were denied franchise even though they comprised a majority of the population. The first sanctions against South Africa started in 1946 with India placing an embargo on exports. [16] Sanctions against South Africa continued until the last ones were lifted in 1995, being most intense throughout the 1980s. [17] Throughout this period, there was substantial debate about whether the sanctions would do more harm than good to the black populations who had the potential to suffer the most hardship from them. For a myriad of reasons, the sanctions put in place against South Africa received significant support even though human suffering was undoubtedly taking place. Not only did the sanctions against South Africa receive the strong support of many international governments, but also the Organizations for African Unity (OAU). [18] This was especially important being that many neighbouring African states with already questionable economies would probably share in at least some of the burden of the sanctions. The then-President of the Organization, Zambia’s President Kenneth Kaunda, "spoke emphatically for sanctions" at the OAU General Assembly in July 1987, stating "that sanctions were the only peaceful means of forcing the regime in Pretoria to abolish its racist policies". [19] Also important was the backing the sanctions received from Nelson Mandela’s party the African National Congress (ANC), who wanted sanctions to remain in force until elections were held and the system of apartheid was officially dismantled. [20] The sanctions in South Africa are viewed for the most part to be an international success. Apartheid was overthrown, and in a free and democratic election Nelson Mandela was elected to lead the country. On the surface, South Africa is a success story in every sense, but that may be overstating the reality of the situation. Neta C. Crawford, co-author of the book South Africa: How Sanctions Work, theorizes that one of the reasons that the South African sanctions are not viewed in the same harsh light as those in Iraq, is due to the fact that since the end of apartheid, there has been no systematic effort to understand the humanitarian impact of the sanctions. Following this argument, she points out that the impact would have varied dramatically across economic sectors and population groups, obscuring actual repercussions. [21] In two cases of multilateral and international sanctions, Iraq and South Africa, it is clear that one has failed, whereas the other succeeded. There are too numerous theories and ideas to name about why this may be the case, but it is only fair to point out that many of the sanctions in South Africa were in place for much more than ten years (the approximate amount of time which sanctions have been in place against Iraq) before success could be reached. The examples of both Iraq and South Africa were instances of multilateral sanctions; are they inherently more effective than bilateral sanctions? It has long be assumed that the answer to this question is an unequivocal yes, but this may not be the case. Theorist Daniel Drezner explores this question and comes to some interesting and surprising conclusions. He explains that for sanctions to work they must impose costs upon the target country in order to make it preferable for them to concede to the sender’s demands. In a global trade environment, it is difficult for one country, when they cut off trade exchange, to be effective in imposing these costs, as target states can simply redirect their economic exchange to other suppliers. He explains: Trade theory suggests that in a world of homogeneous goods and commodities with high elasticity, only a sender with more than half the productive capability of a certain good has the ability to influence the terms of trade. Sanctions with higher levels of international cooperation should impose greater costs on the targeted country because of the inability to locate alternative markets. [22] With this concept explained, it is shocking that in Drezner’s study he discovered that repeated statistical tests show either no link or a negative correlation between international cooperation (multilateral sanctions) and sanction success. [23] These findings suggest that statistically there is no reason to believe that multilateral sanctions will generally be more effective than bilateral sanctions. If this is the case, suggests Drezner, then many states’ foreign policies have been seriously misled over the past several decades. [24] Due to the rise in the use of economic sanctions in recent years, it is important for both economists and political scientists to understand more about what they are, how they are used, and whether they are an effective tool of non-military intervention in various crises. Clearly these are not easy questions to answer. As the world moves further away from the politics and policies of the Cold War, it is necessary for scholars and politicians to comprehend whether sanctions have their proper place in the new global governance system. In such an analysis, it is imperative that issues such as human rights and civilian distress be taken into account. Without considering the human face of international struggles, the whole point of intervention is lost. Economic sanctions have the potential to be an excellent non-violent method of keeping other states from taking advantage of their authority as governments. What is also important is that the international community doesn’t exploit this potential power, and lose sight of the purpose and benefits of global governance. [1] Daniel Drezner, "Bargaining Enforcement and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?", Foreign Affairs (Vol 79, Issue 1), 73. [2] Margret Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (London: 1980), 9. [3] Lisa Martin, Coercive Cooperation (Princeton NJ: 1992), 4. [4] Thomas Weiss, et al, Political Gain and Civilian Pain (New York: 1997), 15. [5] Daniel Drezner, "Bargaining Enforcement and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?", Foreign Affairs (Vol 79, Issue 1), 75. [6] Margret Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (London: 1980), 8-9. [7] Thomas Weiss, et al, Political Gain and Civilian Pain (New York: 1997), 17. [8] Ibid, 16. [9] Thomas Weiss, et al, Political Gain and Civilian Pain (New York: 1997), 93-94. [10] Ibid, 95. [11] Thomas Weiss, et al, Political Gain and Civilian Pain (New York: 1997), 99. [12] Geoff Simmons, The Scourging of Iraq (London: 1996), 51. [13] Geoff Simmons, The Scourging of Iraq (London: 1996), 105. [14] Thomas Weiss, et al, Political Gain and Civilian Pain (New York: 1997), 110. [15] Geoff Simmons, The Scourging of Iraq (London: 1996), 105. [16] Thomas Weiss, et al, Political Gain and Civilian Pain (New York: 1997), 57. [17] Ibid, 58. [18] The Starnberger Institute, The Impact of Economic Sanctions Against South Africa (Harare, 1989), 47. [19] Ibid, 47. [20] Thomas Weiss, et al, Political Gain and Civilian Pain (New York: 1997), xv. [21] Thomas Weiss, et al, Political Gain and Civilian Pain (New York: 1997), 58-59. [22] Daniel Drezner, "Bargaining Enforcement and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?", Foreign Affairs (Vol 79, Issue 1), 75. [23] Ibid, 73. [24] Ibid, 73. Return to Ambassador Index Page |