Ecuador: Crisis In Democracy
By Mary
Velpel
The recent abortive coup
perpetrated by a coalition of mid-ranking military officers allied with
indigenous protest groups calls into question the stability of democracy in
Ecuador where military rule appears to remain an accepted political
option. According to some scholars of
Latin American politics, the discrediting of authoritarian rule in the region
improves the prospects of democracy.[1] However, the Ecuadorian military’s
progressive record of political and economic reform “has restrained the
political learning that has occurred elsewhere, weakening the normative value
attached to democracy.”[2]
As Guillermo O’Donnell has suggested,[3] the positive
perception of Ecuador’s past military regime colours the current popular
support for military rule, as does the relative weakness of the present
democratic government. We will first
compare Ecuador’s experience with military rule in the 1970s to its
post-transition experience with democratic governance in order to understand
the motivations for last year’s uprising.
We will also analyse the emergence of the indigenous protest movement as
the locus of political opposition and its alliance with the military.
Third, Ecuador will be presented
as a deviant case study, as defined by Arend Lijphart, as a case which
problematizes the “established generalizations”[4] of Juan Linz
and Alfred Stepan’s democratic consolidation theory. While Ecuador fits the minimalist definition of an electoral
democracy, the process of consolidation, whereby democracy comes to be
respected as the legitimate political system by public consensus, does not
appear to have occurred in the twenty-two years since the transition from
military rule. However, the failure of
Ecuador’s democracy to meet the criteria of consolidation theory reveals
neither why its indigenous people chose to ally with the military, nor why the
majority of Ecuadorians supported the uprising’s objectives. Consolidation theory treats these events as
proof of non-consolidation, but cannot explain their origins. I suggest that last year’s uprising can best
be understood as symptomatic of the flaw at the heart of Ecuador’s troubled
democracy, the differential treatment of citizens by the state. While Ecuador’s citizens are formally equal
before the law and for the purposes of political participation, widespread
social and economic inequity undermines these rights. In accordance with a liberal understanding of citizenship,
democratic consolidation theory judges the social rights which are necessary to
ensure the meaningful fulfilment of civil rights to be of secondary
importance. Indeed, in Linz and
Stepan’s conception of democratic consolidation, a consolidated democracy need
not ensure social and economic equity, as a highly socially and economically
stratified society indicates a consolidated democracy of poor quality, not an
unconsolidated democracy.[5] Therefore, democratic consolidation theory
does not account for the importance of social and economic equity in a
democracy. I will use the case of
Ecuador to make problematic democratic consolidation theory’s foundation in a
liberal conception of citizenship.
An overview of the events of
January of this year will serve as the starting point for this study. On January 21, 2000, a month-long protest in
the Ecuadorian capital of Quito culminated in the occupation of the national
legislature by indigenous groups and peasants.
The occupation was provoked by President Jamil Mahuad’s plan to replace
the Ecuadorian national currency, the sucre, with the American
dollar. While the immediate target of
the protest was the monetary policy, the protesters’ larger goals were
increased economic equity, investigations into rampant corruption and an end to
the privatization of public enterprises.
These groups were expressing the desire of the majority of Ecuadorians
to repeal devastating structural adjustment policies (SAPs), which have
severely affected the standard of living of average Ecuadorians, while failing
to address the problems of the Ecuadorian economy, which shrank by seven per cent
in the last year, and had a sixty-five per cent rate of unemployment.[6] The SAPs are reviled because they have
impoverished many without righting Ecuador’s worst economic crisis in
memory. The Ecuadorian military moved
to support the uprising, forcing Mahuad to step down in favour of a military
junta on January 26. This group of
junior officers agreed to pursue the requests of the protestors. One of the group’s leaders, Colonel Lucio
Gutierrez, explained that the military “joined the Indians in their protest
that contributed to the fall of the government...to say no more to vile
corruption, which only increased the poverty of Ecuador's people.”[7]Available:
www.radioproject.org/transcripts/0020.html
However, the coup ended as quickly as it had begun. The next day, the junta succumbed to
pressure from international financial institutions and the United States, and
passed power back to the elected politicians:
former Vice President Gustavo Noboa was appointed to the presidency, at
which point he announced his intention to follow through with the monetary
policy.
Despite the failure of the coup
to result in any political change, it served as a grave warning of the state of
democracy in Ecuador. While the
protestors were motivated by economic hardship, they were also responding to
the perceived inadequacies of the democratic system. Ostensibly, Ecuador meets the basic requirements of Dahl’s
minimalist definition of polyarchy,[8]
as it is a regime where citizens can frame and express their political
preferences through a free press, the right to vote in free and fair elections,
the right to compete for public office and the right to organize. Nevertheless, this procedural portrait of
Ecuadorian democracy does not provide a complete understanding of its
limitations. The elected legislature is
excluded from the economic decision-making process, which is dominated by the
executive branch and its technocratic advisory teams. In addition, many members of the legislature either do not abide
by their party allegiances or contravene their election platforms, subverting
the representative function of the party system. Moreover, while all Ecuadorian citizens are guaranteed the right
to vote and thus express their political preferences, their formal, civil
rights are often undermined by the stratification of Ecuadorian society along
the lines of class and ethnicity. As
Allison Brysk notes, in the Ecuadorian case, “citizenship is not equal or meaningful
when access to state services depends on residence, colour, class, language,
and literacy.”[9]
The formation of the peculiar
coalition of the military and the indigenous peasantry represents an extension
of Ecuador’s conflicting historical experiences with military and civilian
rule. During the military dictatorship
in the early 1970s, the armed forces proved to be more developmentalist than
previous elected governments. Even
after democratization, the military has remained highly involved in rural
development. In contrast, the
democratic, civilian regime was founded on neoliberal principles by the
country’s business elites, whose interests diverge from those of the general
population. As a result, the economic
reform and the attending retraction of the state’s ability to supplement civil
rights with social rights has undermined the strength of democracy. As Anita Isaacs presciently noted in 1993,
“military dictatorship, associated with relative economic prosperity and
minimal repression, remains a viable political alternative in Ecuador.”[10] Therefore, this paper will begin by exploring
the reasons why many Ecuadorians retain their “authoritarian nostalgia,”[11]
by comparing the achievements of the military regime of the 1970s to those of
the post-transition democratic governments, in order to better understand the
current political unrest. Then, we will
turn to the question of how this popular dissatisfaction with democracy
reflects on the democratic consolidation literature.
To explain Ecuador’s present
economic and political problems, it is vital to understand its process of
economic development. Ecuador’s economy
has followed the pattern of boom and bust cycles characteristic of single
commodity export economies, as its fortunes first tracked the ups and downs of
the market for raw cacao, and then bananas.[12] The third, and most significant, boom and
bust cycle Ecuador would endure began with oil exploration ventures in
1967. Unlike the other booms, the state
was able to directly harness the oil wealth via the formation of a public
corporation, rather than simply passively receiving tax revenues from private
investors.[13]
Preferring not to entrust these new riches to an unpredictable, populist,
civilian government, the Ecuadorian military assumed power in 1972, under the
dictatorship of General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara, with reformist objectives in
mind. This progressive approach was
informed by the Ecuadorian military’s interpretation of national security
doctrine. The military understood leftist-inspired
insurgencies to be the product of underdevelopment, resulting from foreign
ownership, unequal land distribution and inept government. In order to preempt leftist dissent, the
military sought to become the protector of the interests of the disadvantaged. Apolitical, military rule was considered
necessary to implement the needed reforms.[14]
Reform led in three
directions: the nationalization of the
oil industry, the modernization of the urban economy through industrialization
and the modernization of the rural economy through the redistribution of
property. First, the regime sought to
control the oil industry by demanding that all contracts signed by former
governments with foreign companies be renegotiated, and by joining the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973. Many foreign firms chose to pull out of
Ecuador, rather than confront the government, leaving the public oil
corporation to exploit the bulk of the deposits.[15] The military government then directed these
oil revenues to its reformist project.
As part of these reforms, the
regime attempted to hasten Ecuador’s late entry into the ranks of industrial
economies with a policy of import substitution industrialization. This policy stimulated urban employment, and
helped to encourage the growth of a nascent middle class.[16] It also moved to reform land
distribution. The huasipungo
system of indigenous and mestizo serf labour had been abolished in 1964,
but peasants still lacked land, and in many cases were worse off without the
benefits traditionally entitled to tenants.[17] The military government created the
Ecuadorian Institute for Land Reform and Colonization (IERAC) to redistribute
land to the peasantry, and oil money was directed to the construction of rural
infrastructure. The military government
rode the wave of oil profits, and its policies did improve the standard of
living for poor Ecuadorians. Between
1960 and 1980, life expectancy increased by ten years, and infant mortality
dropped by forty per cent.[18]
However, the three-pronged
reform agenda of oil industry nationalization, industrialization and land
redistribution, eventually sputtered.
First, the attempt to control foreign investment in the oil industry
failed as the multinationals fled Ecuador for more hospitable locations. The national corporation did not have the
resources to initiate exploration, so output stagnated.[19] Thus, the state controlled oil industry
could not generate revenues sufficient to maintain government programs. Second, the capital intensive strategy
pursued by the country’s industrialists required large imports of machinery,
leading to a substantial foreign debt.[20] Third, the investment of oil wealth was
skewed to urban areas, leaving IERAC underfunded and ineffectual: only three
per cent of Ecuador’s arable land was permanently redistributed during this
period.[21] To summarize, the military’s efforts to use
the oil profits to improve the situation of Ecuador’s poor, while well-intentioned,
had little real impact.
Notably, these reformist
policies did succeed in sparking elite disapproval, as the business class
loathed the nationalist oil policies which scared off foreign investment, the
limitation of imports and state involvement in industry.[22] The rural elite also refused to surrender to
land reform, and their apprehension regarding potential threats to private
property rights was shared by wealthy urban exporters.[23] Although business leaders were discontented
with the military’s policy direction, they were more frustrated by the style of
military governance. Business leaders
found themselves shut out of the economic decision-making process under the
military government, as the military employed technocrats to generate policies,
in keeping with their apolitical philosophy.
Hence, the business class could not influence government to change what
it perceived to be inappropriate economic policies. Thus, Ecuador’s business elite pressured the military to hand
over power to a civilian, democratically-elected government in hopes of gaining
more access to economic policy formulation.[24] Faced with vocal challenges from these
powerful groups, Rodriguez Lara agreed in 1976 to cede authority to a military
triumvirate which would in turn oversee the transition to democratic
governance.
Although the Rodriguez Lara
regime may have attempted to implement inclusive economic policies, it was
largely unconcerned with increasing political participation.[25]
The regime had been tolerant of limited political opposition, even advocating
the expansion of unions, while refusing to engage in the human rights abuses
that were systematic elsewhere in Latin America at the time. However, political reform was not part of
the progressive agenda until the transition period. Under the triumvirate’s supervision, the military turned its
attention to crafting a progressive political system to match its economic
agenda. Three commissions of civil
society actors, including academics, were enlisted to draft a new constitution.[26] The most significant change to pre-military
democratic institutions brought about by the 1978 Constitution was the lifting
of strict literacy requirements, which extended the franchise
significantly. In fact, prior to the
first post-transition presidential election in 1979, no more than eighteen per
cent of the population had ever voted.[27] This reform, in conjunction with widespread registration drives, caused the
size of the electorate to double between 1979 and 1988.[28] Wary as the
elites were of extending the franchise in this manner, they agreed,
understanding that any party which advocated restricting the suffrage would
likely be punished at the polls.[29] Hence, it was the outgoing military regime,
and not the civilian elite advocates of democracy, which insisted on creating a
polyarchical system in Ecuador. This
commitment to political and economic reform marked the military in the eyes of
many as an ally against elite domination and a supporter of development, as it
“assumed the role that had been played by a democratically elected populist
leadership elsewhere.”[30] It would be the experience of neoliberal
democracy which would cement this impression.
From the first, the
post-transition democratic governments were troubled, saddled with pressing
economic problems. Throughout the
1970s, the military regime had accumulated a large debt, first to finance
industrialization, then to import food when growth in the agricultural sector
stagnated. Foreign financial
institutions had been happy to lend to Ecuador, eyeing its oil wealth. When oil prices dropped precipitously in the
early 1980s, Ecuador was left unable to repay these loans.[31] The civilian governments had little choice
but to enact IMF-directed SAPs, opening the oil industry up to foreign
ownership, devaluing the sucre and cutting price subsidies. These policies did not pull Ecuador out of
its oil-bust-induced recession, and eight different economic plans were
introduced between 1982 and 1988.[32] The democratic governments were unfortunate
enough to come to power at a time when critical economic problems required
politically unpopular solutions.
While these SAPs did little to
foster economic growth, they did impoverish many already at the margins of the
Ecuadorian economy. The repeated
currency devaluations, combined with the halting of price subsidies, caused
spikes in inflation which dramatically reduced the purchasing power of the
lower classes. The plight of the
working class was exacerbated by the partial transfer of the costs for services
to the population through user fees for schooling and health care.[33] Thus, it was the urban lower and working
classes, which had grown throughout the 1970s in response to the
industrialization policies, price controls and subsidies, that were the most
vulnerable to the effects of the SAPs.[34] The small middle class also struggled, as
the retraction of the state’s administrative role reduced employment
opportunities.[35] Many men were forced to accept casual labour
in the informal sector without benefits or security.[36] However, women bore a greater burden, as they had to maintain the
household with their reproductive work while earning an income outside it to
supplement the family budget.[37] Urban households suffered dramatically due
to the structural adjustment restrictions, but rural areas were also affected
by the reduction of state investment in rural infrastructure. Desperate to hold on to their small plots
of land and their peasant identity, many campesinos migrated temporarily
to the city to seek work in the informal sector to supplement their subsistence
agriculture. The lack of stable
employment in the urban areas discouraged permanent settlement: ten per cent of
urban workers commuted daily from farms to the city.[38] Moreover, land redistribution, the route to
economic security for many landless peasants, stalled with drastic cutbacks to
the administration of IERAC: the land-titling agency’s staff was cut from 2 000
to 400 in 1994.[39] Thus, the majority of Ecuadorians are
adversely affected by SAPs, including the urban poor, the middle class and the
peasantry.
The state of the economy
reflected poorly on the performance of the democratic governments, but the
greatest threat to democracy’s legitimacy in Ecuador was the lack of effective
representation. Power was concentrated
in the executive branch of the government, leaving Congress largely excluded
from the economic decision-making process.
In addition, the ability of the legislature to represent voters and
render the executive accountable was hampered by an incoherent party system. The crisis of representation combined with
economic hardship under the democratic governments of the 1980s and 1990s led
to disenchantment with democracy in principle, invoking nostalgia for the
previous military regime. For many
Ecuadorians, the futility of political participation under democratic rule rendered
the government as inaccessible as it had been under the military regime.
The crisis of representation in
Ecuador is evident in the concentration of decision-making power in the
executive branch. This isolation of
economic decision-making from political debate is a legacy of the military
regime which attempted to insulate it from the popular pressures which the
military believed to be the source of previous policy mistakes. While monetary
policy has generally been outside the political arena even in established
Western democracies, the lack of accountability for economic decisions is
extensive in Ecuador.[40] Indeed, Ecuador exemplifies O’Donnell’s
conception of “delegative democracy.”
As O’Donnell describes, the president of Ecuador relies on the advice of
teams of unelected economic advisors, or técnios, whose expertise is
never open to dispute in the legislature.[41] The elected members of Congress are
considered either incapable of understanding the technical intricacies of economic
policy or too politically motivated to appreciate its implications. The técnios of Ecuador view all
politicians as “voracious rent-seekers” who need to be denied input in
essentially “apolitical” decisions.[42] The “apolitical” character of the
technocratic teams is reinforced by their tendency to switch party alliances
with each election: Ecuador’s political
leadership changes but the economic advisors remain constant.[43] Furthermore, according to the Ecuadorian
conception of executive leadership, the president has been elected directly by
the people to represent their best interests, so he should be unhindered by
interference by the legislature in his efforts to implement the plans of the técnios. The domain of economic policy is considered
too important to be subject to public debate, because the necessary measures
must be implemented unmodified regardless of their unpopularity, in order to be
effective. The more unpopular the
agenda, the more the president tries to isolate the technocratic team from political
interference.[44] Indeed, the Ecuadorian constitution allows
the president to sign any bill into law which is considered to be of “urgent”
importance which Congress is reluctant to confirm, an article which is used to maintain
exclusive executive control over economic decision-making and shield the
president’s technocratic advisors from political criticism. Many of the SAPs have been enacted under
this legislation. For example,
President Léon Febres Cordero decreed twenty-six urgent economic decrees during
his four year administration.[45] By portraying Congress as an impediment to
governance, the president is able to exclude popular representatives from
decision-making. Interestingly enough,
the business leaders who initiated democratization in Ecuador in hopes of
gaining more access to the decision-making process have also become frustrated
with the isolation of the técnios from political interest groups. For as much as these elites have supported
the retraction of the state under neo-liberalism, often they would prefer to
negotiate the modification of some of the SAPs, as the pure logic of economic
models employed by the técnios runs contrary to the practicalities of
the business world.[46] While the business class remains frustrated
by its exclusion from decision-making, elites retain more influence than those
on the economic margins, for whom these policies have profound implications. The dearth of transparency and
accountability at the executive level confounds the principle of democratic
representation for the Ecuadorian public, engendering dissatisfaction with
democratic governance.
However, the concentration of
power in the executive branch is not entirely due to Ecuador’s political
institutions. Catherine Conaghan and James Malloy note that “while extensive
powers were ascribed to each president in the constitution, presidential power
was not simply an artifact of the legal structure...Presidents worked actively
to enhance their power, especially to neutralize Congress as a potential site
of opposition to their programs.”[47]
To discourage dissension by Congress members, especially its most disruptive
form, the interpellation of cabinet ministers, the president would induce
desertion from the opposing party line through patronage awards.[48] The president’s need to acquire support from
the legislature is complemented by the members’ need for patronage resources
and plums to dole out to their constituency client networks, the accepted means
of linking the public to the state in Ecuador.[49] The patron-client relationship has become
especially prevalent with the growth of the urban, informal sector of the
economy that has been associated with structural adjustment, as the populace
needs the protection from the police, the legal representation and the
infrastructure extensions which only a politician patron can provide when the
state itself has withdrawn from these functions.[50] Thus, the lures of patronage proffered by
the president are enticing for Congress members, allowing for the concentration
of power in the executive branch. The silencing of effective opposition with
selective incentives removes an important check on presidential power. Weber’s insight, as paraphrased by
O’Donnell, that “institutions deprived of real power and responsibility tend to
act in ways that seem to confirm the reasons adduced for this deprivation,”[51]
is a telling description of the functioning of the Ecuadorian Congress. Ecuador’s political parties, whose
representative function has been undermined in the Congress by executive power
and technocratic decision-making, have become largely insignificant
institutions.[52] Excluded from the discussion of economic
policy, parties have ceased to serve as effective representatives. The party system is chaotic and fractured,
characterized by frequent switching of allegiances and inconsistent platforms,
fostering disillusionment amongst voters.[53]
Some of the problems within the
party system stem from the transition period.
The military-appointed commissions recommended that the new constitution
include measures to limit the rise of personalist, populist political forces,
which were considered incompatible with Ecuador’s new, progressive system. In order to prevent the emergence of
independent demagogues, all candidates for Congress and the presidency had to
be associated with a party approved by an electoral oversight committee. However, this provision resulted in the
creation of sham parties to act as vehicles for ambitious politicians, and
rivalries over leadership and patronage distribution led to schisms. Consequently, the number of parties
exploded, with 23 new parties being recognized officially between 1978 and
1992, making for a divided and ineffective Congress.[54] Exacerbating this fractiousness is the
phenomenon of camisetazo, the switching of party loyalties by
politicians as though they were tee-shirts.
Politicians change parties in order to disassociate themselves with
unpopular economic policies (for the ruling party is usually blamed for the
failure of economic policies it had no hand in crafting) or to gain more
patronage resources, a practice which undermines the representative function of
the party system.[55] Moreover, politicians actively dissimulate
during election campaigns, running on platforms which are completely opposite
to the policies they intend to enact upon election. Aware that the electorate is likely to vote for whichever
candidate can distance himself the furthest from the policies of his
predecessor, candidates will purposely disguise their intentions, renouncing
structural adjustment whilst recruiting a new team of orthodox técnios.[56] Thus, politicians have become
discredited in the eyes of voters, disgracing democratic governance.[57] As a statement by coup leader Gutierrez indicates,
disappointment with politicians translates into disappointment with the system
in general.
In
Ecuador democracy has been reduced to elections, the candidates deceive the
people with all manner of promises that they never fulfill. Once the candidates
get into power they forget about the people, and they use their power for their
own personal benefit. That's not democracy. So that is what we were fighting
against, against that pseudo-democracy.[58]
This frustration and
disillusionment with the lack of representation in the electoral system first
manifested itself in a widely heeded boycott of the 1992 elections led by the
indigenous protest movement, the Confederation of Indigenous Nations of Ecuador
(CONAIE),[59]
and again in the January uprising.
The weakness of the party
system, combined with the concentration of power in the hands of the president
and his technocratic advisors, has created a crisis of representation, which
has undermined the legitimacy of democracy in Ecuador. The popular discontentment engendered by the
economic upheaval associated with the SAPs has been compounded by the perceived
failure of democracy to include the public.
Ecuador’s political system has evolved into what Conaghan calls a
“‘democratic-authoritarian’ hybrid that combines electioneering in a public
sphere with a privatization of economic policy-making.”[60] The economic degeneration alone did not
create the popular disenchantment with democracy; the subversion of the
political process and the lack of accountability for the destructive economic
policies to those who were worst-affected has discouraged faith in democratic
governance. Ecuador’s negative
experience with neoliberal, democratic government contrasts sharply with the
relative prosperity of the military regime.
This disillusionment with
conventional political parties and the democratic system has led to the
emergence outside the conventional political system of an influential
indigenous protest movement as the most active opposition group in Ecuadorian
society. The indigenous movement has
become the locus for opposition to the ruling government, as it vocally objects
to the SAPs and the erosion of democracy as part of its wider program of
indigenous rights. Although indigenous
peoples make up approximately 37.5 per cent of the population,[61]
the Ecuadorian state is still reluctant to fully acknowledge its
“pluricultural” heritage, preferring to construct the notion of a homogenized mestizo
nation.[62] The indigenous movement’s struggle to
achieve citizenship rights which account for their ethnic difference coincides
with the struggle for greater political participation and recognition by the
population as a whole. The indigenous
movement has stepped into the void left by the absence of a mass-based
political party and middle class leadership.
Such alternative loci of power were stymied by the years of political
exclusion under the literacy requirements for the franchise.[63]
Moreover, even if such a political party were to exist, its impact would be
limited by the aforementioned constraints on effective representation within
the democratic system. The appearance
of the indigenous movement as the only coherent channel for popular opposition
is thus linked to the crisis of representation within Ecuador’s democracy.
The indigenous movement is so
vigorous and well-organized in Ecuador for several reasons. First, solidarity amongst varying tribes has
been generated by the sharing of a common language, Quichua, which was
originally imposed as a lingua franca by early Catholic missionaries
seeking to facilitate the spread of Christianity.[64] Second, a large proportion of the original
indigenous population survived colonization, partly because of the
inaccessibility of their homelands in the Amazonian jungle and the Andean
highlands. The concentration of
indigenous communities in certain areas of Ecuador has helped to induce
political mobilization, especially with the dismantling of the traditional
rural power structures with land reform.[65] Third, a new generation of publicly educated
leaders has combined traditional values with modern political knowledge to form
these new advocacy organizations. As
the mission statement of CONAIE expounds, these groups “guarantee the
indigenous people the political voice that has too long been denied them.”[66] The indigenous movement is constituted of
loosely affiliated, autonomous groups representing different segments of the
indigenous population. Although each
of these various organizations has its own specific focus, they are united by
their focus on indigenous identity and by their insistence on their
independence from the state and the party system.
CONAIE, the largest and most
influential of these organizations, initiated the January uprising, but it drew
upon the support of a variety of other indigenous organizations, including
peasant unions, evangelical Christian missions, and tribal federations from
deep within the Amazon.[67] The diversity of indigenous experiences and
needs is reflected in the plurality of organizations. Nevertheless, these groups have come together repeatedly to
exercise their combined influence to lobby the state for greater recognition of
indigenous issues and more recently for wider issues of economic equity and
democratic representation. The first
unified protest took place in 1990, and was aimed at the detrimental effects of
SAPs, including cut-backs to administrative organs for land redistribution and
irrigation access, and skyrocketing
inflation. Although this protest was
not acknowledged by the government, it helped to galvanize the movement through
experience with explicitly political participation. Other uprisings to protest
structural adjustment and exclusion from government followed in 1994 and 1997,
and the indigenous groups gradually acquired broader support from mestizo
campesinos, students, the urban poor and leftists. Since the 1997 uprising, CONAIE has become
an integral part of any social mobilization and is regularly consulted by
opposition groups.[68] Although 61 per cent of Ecuadorians are
considered to be urbanized,[69]
connections between urban organizations and the rurally based indigenous
movement is facilitated by the close links which city-dwellers retain to their
rural origins. Thus, the indigenous
movement has been able to create linkages with other groups within Ecuadorian
society, and has risen to the forefront of political opposition.
The indigenous movement has even
formed a political party to express its agenda in Congress. CONAIE has served as the backbone of the
Pachakutic party. This party’s platform
is intended to appeal to a wider segment of Ecuador’s electorate, as it is
critical of both the government’s SAPs and the diminution of representative
input in the political process. While
Pachakutic has succeeded in electing 6 of 121 Congress members,[70]
and 15 of 200 canton mayors,[71]available:
http://perso:club-internet.fr/lipietz/CD/CD_Bolivar.html its impact has been
limited by the crisis of representation within the political system. Faced with this blockage within the system,
the indigenous movement chose to work outside it. The widespread popular support for this decision is demonstrated
by public opinion surveys which found that 71 per cent of all Ecuadorians
agreed with the January occupation of the Congress. This support for the indigenous movement signifies the reduced
legitimacy of the democratic system.
Clearly, as the only coherent and mobilized opposition force in
Ecuadorian politics, the indigenous movement has served as the focal point for
dissension. Middle and lower class
Ecuadorians are drawn to this non-violent movement which speaks for their
interests when government is unresponsive due to its undermined representative
function.[72] The indigenous movement originated in a
struggle for protection of its “ancestral space,”[73] and has
evolved into a conduit for popular dissent.
The ad hoc alliance between the
indigenous protest movement and the military is consistent with the military’s
traditional understanding of its role in Ecuadorian society, as the
“radical/reformist vanguard that would...protect national and popular
interests.”[74] Thus, the officers felt obliged to intervene
in support of the popular opposition to what they too perceived to be a corrupt
and unjust government. This logic is
expressed by Gutierrez, who accounted for the officers’ participation in the
coup with the rationale that “the military must defend the people, as well as
maintaining its integrity and territorial sovereignty. We believe that the armed forces are justified
in taking measures to defend the people.”[75] This interpretation of the military’s
political and social role is consonant with the developmentalist doctrine which
Ecuador’s military institutions articulate.
The Institute for Advanced National Studies, an arm of the military
college, has formulated a doctrine for the armed forces which lists “extreme
poverty, hunger, unemployment and racial distrust” to be the primary threats to
national security.[76] Indeed, the military’s duty to participate
in social and economic development was enshrined in the 1978 Constitution.[77] In accordance with this doctrine, the
military response to previous uprisings has been involvement in civic action
programs. In particular, the 1990 uprising
spurred the military to increase the interaction of over five hundred of its
rural garrisons with local communities, involving soldiers in the construction
of schools and public works.[78]
The credibility of the
military’s developmentalist rhetoric is enhanced by its excellent record of
respect for human rights. In fact, it
was the civilian police under the democradura administration of
President Febres Cordero which committed human rights abuses in the mid-1980s.[79] To show their disapproval of these
violations, a small group of Air Force officers “detained” Febres Cordero for
several days in 1987 to encourage him to halt his repressive tactics.[80] This respect for human rights, in
combination with its progressive approach, has earned the military the trust of
opposition groups, including the indigenous movement. For instance, in its mission statement, the Federation of
Indigenous Peoples and Campesinos of Imbabura (FICI), one of the many
smaller organizations affiliated with CONAIE, recognizes the military as the
primary protector of the popular interest: “we make the Armed Forces
...responsible for the life and the physical integrity of our National,
Provincial and Local leaders.”[81]Available:
http://fici.nativeweb.org/docs/uprising_13jan00.html When confronted with clear popular opposition to the
democratically elected regime, the military chose to perform its duty as
protector of the popular interest, with the acceptance of a citizenry disabused
of its faith in democracy, and nostalgic for the relative prosperity associated
with military rule.
Furthermore, the junior officers who collaborated with the
indigenous leaders shared their socio-economic perspective, as the composition
of the military mirrors the stratification of Ecuadorian society. The rank and file of the military is
constituted almost exclusively of indigenous and mestizo conscripts,
enhancing the military’s identification with the protest movement.[82] However, the senior leadership is comprised
of commissioned officers, those who voluntarily chose a military career and had
the resources to attend military college,[83] a
characterization which suggests more tenuous ties to the indigenous
movement. This tension between the
conservative senior leadership and the more radical junior officers was exposed
during the coup, as the junior officers were obliged to step down at the behest
of the senior leadership, which was more mindful of the threat of international
financial ostracism.[84] Hence, the military is not a unitary actor,
and the conflicts between the junior officers and the senior leadership cannot
be understood without acknowledging that the military is an institution
embedded within Ecuadorian society, and that it exhibits the same class and
ethnic divisions.[85] The alliance of the military and the
indigenous movement is a function of this socio-economic dynamic.
The alliance of opposition
forces and the military bespeaks the grave state of democracy in Ecuador,
suggesting that the process of democratic consolidation was not occurring. In order to judge the applicability of the
concept of consolidation to the Ecuadorian context, it is important to first
explicate the tenets of the theory. Linz and Stepan, the principal contributors[86]
to this literature, consider democracy to be consolidated once it is accepted
as “the only game in town,” meaning that democracy has come to be respected as
the only legitimate political system by popular consensus.[87] This acceptance of democracy is most easily
achieved in an internationally recognized state where: civil society is active;
the rule of law is paramount; a “political society” constituted of parties, a
legislature and electoral processes is established; a bureaucracy functions to
sustain the state; and an “economic society” is formed by state involvement in
the economy.[88] The success of the consolidation process is
also dependent in part on the previous regime type, as the prospects of
consolidation are affected by the form of transition the state experienced.[89] International forces also play an important
role in determining the success of the consolidation, as pressure to
democratize from powerful allies, and the worldwide trend towards
democratization (what Linz and Stepan label the democratic “zeitgeist”), both
encourage a successful transition.[90] Linz and Stepan also assert that economic
crises affect non-democratic regimes more than they do democracies, as
dissatisfied citizens are assured of their ability to change the direction of
the economy in the next election. By
the same token, if the democracy is perceived as ineffectual in the face of
economic crises, its legitimacy will be called into question. Hence, the collapse of democracies
confronted with economic problems is due to inherent political problems, not
economic instability.[91]
According to this definition,
Ecuador is not a consolidated democracy, as the January uprising demonstrates
that the primary indication of consolidation, the acceptance of democracy as
“the only game in town,” is not present in Ecuador. In a consolidated democratic regime, an economic and political
crisis such as the one Ecuador experienced in January should suggest
constitutional solutions, not military intervention. There is no consensus
amongst Ecuadorians that democracy is preferable to military rule. Indeed, J. Samuel Fitch proposes that
Ecuador presents the “worst case scenario” for the reform of civil-military
relations that is required for democratic consolidation because military rule
remains a viable political option and the military has not relinquished its
role as political arbiter.[92] As indicated by democratic consolidation
theory, the impact of the transition period has been lasting. The military ceded political control to the
disgruntled business elites at its own prerogative, not due to any collapse, so
it was able to dictate the terms of transition, enshrining in the constitution
its duty to act as a political and social guardian. Moreover, Ecuador’s “political society” is fractured and
unstable, with an abundance of unrepresentative parties in an ineffectual
legislature.[93]
Ecuador exhibits “the deep and continuous confrontation and ambivalence about
democratic institutions” which indicates a failure to consolidate.[94] Thus, it appears as though Ecuador can be
understood as an unconsolidated democracy within the conceptual framework of
democratic consolidation theory.
However, this teleological
characterization of Ecuador’s troubled democracy as stalled in the midst of an
inevitable process of consolidation, only considers the symptoms of a more
essential problem. Democratic
consolidation theory can only point to the institutionalization of the
military’s role during the transition to explain why military rule remains a
politically viable option. It also
sheds little light on the failure of the majority of Ecuadorians to accept
democracy as “the only game in town,” as demonstrated by the support expressed
for the choice of the alliance of the military and the indigenous movement to
act outside the democratic system. The
fundamental deficiency of Ecuadorian democracy is the stratification of
citizenship, a problem which is unaddressed by democratic consolidation theory. Notably, Ecuador has been described as “a
democracy without citizens.”[95] The question of differential citizenship is
unaddressed by democratic consolidation theory because one of its key
assumptions is a liberal conception of citizenship. This implicit assumption is apparent in Linz and Stepan’s
position that social and economic inequality is compatible with the notion of
democratic consolidation, as inequity indicates a consolidated democracy of
poor quality, not an unconsolidated democracy.[96] Therefore, social and economic equity is not
integral to the consolidation of democracy.
According to this liberal conception
of citizenship, for the purposes of political participation, all citizens are
equals before the state. Differentials
in social and economic status are “bracketed” so that all citizens can
participate “‘as if’ they were social equals.”[97] This liberal remedy to the dilemma of social
and economic inequity does not resolve the underlying status differentials.[98] This liberal definition is problematic for
two reasons. First, it ignores the
impact of social and economic inequity on the full achievement of civil
rights. Without the protection of
social rights, civil rights cannot be fully achieved.[99] Second, the masking of social and economic
inequity homogenizes, creating a “false ‘we’” and an unrepresentative unified
public interest.[100] The recent uprising in Ecuador can best be
understood as a challenge to this conception of citizenship, for it is these
two main problems which ensure the fragility of Ecuadorian democracy and the
popular readiness to accept military rule.
The liberal
conception of citizenship is largely a formality in Ecuador, as the state has
failed to provide the social rights to substantiate its citizens’ civil
rights. For instance, substantial
barriers to equality for all before the law continue to exist, undermining a
fundamental civil right. In rural
areas, judicial facilities are often inaccessible, concentrated as they are in
far off urban centres. Moreover, the
lack of free legal representation, translators and ombudsmen puts judicial
remedies beyond the reach of indigenous and campesino petitioners.[101] In addition, the rule of law does not extend
into the informal sector, where much of Ecuador’s business interaction takes
place.[102] Chronic underfunding of bilingual education
facilities exacerbates the problem of indigenous illiteracy, reinforcing a
barrier to effective political participation.[103] While the lack of social rights has a direct
impact on the realization of civil rights, it also reinforces the system of
patron-client relationships which O’Donnell identifies as symptomatic of poorly
functioning democracies.[104] In the words of Carlos de la Torre, “the
schizophrenic coexistence of universal rights in the solemn declarations of the
state and the lack of implementation of these same rights in everyday life
explain why the poor search for a benefactor.”[105] The refusal of Ecuador’s liberal democratic
state to adequately provide for the social rights of citizenship undermines its
guarantee of civil rights. Thus, the
opposition’s struggle to end the structural adjustment process which has
limited the redistributive role of the state is best understood as a demand for
the substantiation of civil rights with social rights. The acceptance of military rule is directly
related to this discourse of substantiated citizenship, for it is the
perception that the military was more accommodating of social rights that
drives popular authoritarian nostalgia.
It appears as though Ecuadorians prefer the protection of social rights
and economic security to unfulfilled promises of civil rights.
The liberal
conception of citizenship is particularly inadequate for Ecuador’s indigenous
peoples, as its tendency to deny difference marginalizes indigenous
citizens. According to state discourse,
all Ecuadorians are mestizo, a doctrine which denies the distinct
character of indigenous citizens: “‘true’ citizens were not Indians.”[106] This approach to citizenship does not consider
the particularity of indigenous needs and demands. For instance, it was not until recently that the necessity of
bilingual education or translators within government agencies was acknowledged.[107] Only after concerted protests by the
indigenous movement in 1998 did the state recognize the “plurinational and
pluricultural” nature of its domain.[108] Although the previous military regime also
ignored the need for particularized consideration of indigenous concerns, its
corporate approach allowed for the extension of social rights to entire rural
communities through the establishment of “peasant unions.” Under
democratization, the corporatist notion of political participation has been
eliminated and replaced by the liberal notion of individual interaction with
the state. But this discourse of
individual civil rights rings hollow for the indigenous community, as the state
cannot extend its reach to the rural hinterlands to guarantee these civil rights.[109] This homogenized conception of citizenship
has only reinforced the indigenous community’s position at the bottom of
Ecuadorian society: “poverty is not politically neutral” as it has been
“concentrated in areas of conflictual ethnicity, landlessness, and political
exclusion.”[110]
While the
indigenous movement has succeeded drawing attention to the plight of indigenous
citizens through its protests, and has even negotiated the extension of
communal territory, it has yet to achieve its ultimate goal of autonomous jurisdiction
over its communities. For the
indigenous movement, the homogenizing and thus impoverishing influence of the
state will only be ameliorated through the recognition that “differentiated
citizenship should coincide with differentiated administrative
boundaries.” This objective need not
entail separatism, but requires recognition by the state that it can
accommodate many nations.[111] The creation of an alternative public sphere[112]
where indigenous difference is recognized will help to overcome the
disempowerment associated with the homogenizing liberal notion of citizenship
adhered to by the Ecuadorian state.
An analysis of
Ecuador’s troubled democracy seems to indicate that democratic consolidation
theory is an insufficient explanation of the crisis of democracy in Ecuador, as
it does not address the Ecuadorian state’s problematic understanding of
citizenship. Ecuador’s liberal
democratic state has proven itself incapable of protecting its citizens’ civil
rights by substantiating them with social rights. In addition, democracy suffers from the contrast with the
previous military regime, with its comparatively greater concern with social
and economic development. As a result,
anti-democratic sentiment flourishes, expressed in the widespread support for
the indigenous movement’s alliance with the military during last year’s
protests against economic hardship and political exclusion. Denied access to economic policy-making by
the concentration of executive power and the weakness of the party system,
popular acceptance for democracy has waned.
Recognizing that the existing political framework is exclusionary,
opposition has been channelled through the indigenous protest movement which
works outside the institutional framework.
Thus, the case of Ecuador calls into question the value of democratic
theories which focus exclusively on formal institutions or which are predicated
on the assumption of liberal citizenship.
The citizens of Ecuador are unable to fully enjoy the civil rights
entailed in democracy because of rampant social and economic inequity. This observation regarding the
inapplicability of liberal concepts of citizenship to the case of Ecuador has
important implications for democratic theory.
The basis of democratic consolidation theory on liberal citizenship
results in an idealized model of democracy with little analytical relevance in
contexts where citizenship rights are systematically undermined, as in Ecuador
and throughout the rest of the Third World.
NOTES
[1] Kurt von Mettenheim and James
Malloy, “Conclusion,” in Kurt von Mettenheim and James Malloy, eds., in Deepening
Democracy in Latin America (Pittsburgh, PA: U of Pittsburgh P, 1998), 176,
and Guillermo O’Donnell, “Transitions, Continuities and Paradoxes,” in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell,
and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American
Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, IN: U of Notre Dame P,
1992), 20.
[2]Anita Isaacs, Military Rule and Transition in Ecuador, 1972-1992
(Pittsburgh, PA: U of Pittsburgh P, 1993), 137.
[3]O’Donnell, “Transitions, Continuities and Paradoxes,” 35.
[4]Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and Comparative Method,” American
Political Science Review 65 (1971): 692.
[5]Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996), 6.
[6]Catherine Elton, “Jungle Fever,” New Republic (7 February 2000),
14.
[7]“A Popular Uprising: A Look at Ecuador’s Coup,” host Phillip Babitch, Making
Contact, National Radio Project, Oakland, CA, 17 May 2000.
[8]Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New
Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1971), 3.
[9]Alison Brysk, From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights
and International Relations in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000),
285.
[10]Isaacs, 143.
[11]Ibid., 137.
[12]Wendy Weiss, “Debt and Devaluation: The Burden on Ecuador’s Popular
Class,” Latin American Perspectives 24 (1997), 14.
[13]Catherine M. Conaghan, Restructuring Domination: Industrialists and
the State in Ecuador (Pittsburgh, PA: U of Pittsburgh P, 1988), 47.
[14] J. Samuel Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1998), 15-16.
[15]Jeanne A. K. Hey, Theories of Dependent Foreign Policy and the Case
of Ecuador in the 1980s (Athens, OH: Ohio University Centre for
International Studies, 1995), 89.
[16]Carlos Larrea and Liisa L. North, “Ecuador: adjustment policy impacts on
truncated development and democratisation,”
Third World Quarterly 18 (1997): 919.
[17]Tanya Korovkin, “Indigenous Peasant Struggles and the Capitalist
Modernization of Agriculture: Chimborazo,
1964-1991,” Latin American Perspectives 24 (1997), 28.
[18]Caroline E. Moser, “Adjustment from Below: Low-Income Women, Time and
the Triple Role in Guayaquil, Ecuador,” in Sarah A. Radcliffe and Sallie
Westwood, eds., ‘Viva.’ Women and Popular Protest in Latin America
(London: Routledge, 1993), 177.
[19]Hey, 90.
[20]Larrea and North, 919.
[21]Korovkin, 28.
[22]Conaghan, Restructuring Domination, 114.
[23]Korovkin, 28.
[24]Conaghan, “Capitalists, Technocrats and Politicians: Economic Policy
Making and Democracy in the Central Andes,” in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo
O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., Issues in Democratic
Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective
(Notre Dame, IN: U of Notre Dame P, 1992), 199.
[25]Catherine M. Conaghan and James M. Malloy, Unsettling Statecraft:
Democracy and Neoliberalism
in the Central Andes (Pittsburgh, PA: U of Pittsburgh P, 1994), 207.
[26]Carlos de la Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America: The
Ecuadorian Experience (Athens, OH: Ohio UP, 2000), 83-85.
[27]Conaghan, Restructuring Domination, 124.
[28]de la Torre, 85.
[29]In her seminal survey study of elite attitudes, Catherine Conaghan found
that 51 per cent of the respondents opposed removing the literacy requirements,
as illiterates were considered “incapable of making competent electoral
decisions.” See, Restructuring Domination, 67.
[30]Isaacs, 58.
[31]Weiss, 11.
[32]Moser, 178.
[33]Ibid., 180-184.
[34]Weiss, 27.
[35]Conaghan and Malloy, 230.
[36]William F. Waters, “The Road of Many Returns: Rural Bases of the
Informal Urban Economy in Ecuador,” Latin
American Perspectives 24 (1997), 52.
[37]Kathryn Pitkin and Ritha Bedoya, “Women’s Multiple Roles in Economic
Crisis: Constraints and Adaptations,” Latin American Perspectives 24
(1997): 46.
[38]Waters, 55-56.
[39]Brysk, 110.
[40]Conaghan and Malloy, 213.
[41]O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F.
Plattner, eds., The Global
Resurgence of Democracy, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP,
1996), 99.
[42]Conaghan and Malloy, 213-214.
[43]Susan Stokes, “Democracy and the Limits of Popular Sovereignty in South
America,” in Joseph Tulchin and Bernice Romero, eds., The Consolidation of
Democracy in Latin America
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1995), 76.
[44]O’Donnell, “Delegative,” 99-100.
[45]Conaghan and Malloy, 145-146.
[46]Conaghan, “Capitalists, Technocrats and Politicians,” 200.
[47]Conaghan and Malloy, 159.
[48]Ibid., 147.
[49]de la Torre, 107.